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Abstract 
Using SVAR models on quarterly data for 1996-97:1 to 2011-12:1, the paper 
examines the relative importance of various transmission channels of monetary 
policy to GDP growth and inflation in India. It finds that external exogenous factors 
prolong the impact of monetary policy transmission on GDP growth and inflation in 
India, while removing the problem of ‘price puzzle’. Among the various channels of 
transmission, interest rate channel, credit channel and asset prices channel are 
found to be important, while exchange rate channel is weak. A positive shock to 
policy rate leads to slowdown in credit growth with a lag of two quarters and 
subsequently impacts GDP growth and inflation negatively. The same monetary 
policy shock has a negative impact on asset prices from the third quarter onwards 
and, in turn, has a pronounced negative impact on GDP growth and inflation. 
Exchange rate channel is found to have an insignificant impact on GDP growth, but 
has non-negligible impact on inflation. Interest rate channel is found to account for 
about half of the total impact of monetary shocks on GDP growth and about one-third 
of the total impact on inflation, indicating that interest rate channel is the most 
important channel for monetary policy transmission in India.  
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Introduction 
Monetary policy transmission is a process through which monetary policy 
decisions affect the economy in general and the price level in particular. Monetary 
transmission mechanism is a complex process - the famous “black box” - as many 
channels can simultaneously work to achieve the final policy objectives. Therefore, 
understanding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to real activity has 
always been a subject of contemporary interest for researchers. Even though the 
literature identifies many channels, viz., interest rates, bank lending, the exchange 
rate, inflationary expectation, balance sheet effects, and asset price, there is little 
agreement on either their precise functioning or their relative importance in achieving 
the monetary policy objectives. Therefore, monetary policy transmission mechanism 
is still considered to be a “black box”. Channels of monetary policy transmission are 
essential to identify from the perspective of the efficacy of various policy instruments 
and timing of policy actions and thus critically important for the design and 
implementation of monetary policy. In fact, successful conduct of monetary policy 
depends on the ability of policymakers to identify the changes in the parameters 
related to transmission, and to alter monetary frameworks accordingly.  
The process of monetary policy transmission begins with the transmission of 
policy actions to market interest rates and from there onwards, transmission may 
proceed to real sector through any of the several channels. Monetary policy is 
considered to be effective, if it can affect, by managing a short-term interest rate, the 
longer end of interest rate structure, which is most relevant for decisions on 
investment and consumption. Nonetheless, the proliferation of monetary policy 
actions on the interest rate structure largely depends on development of financial 
markets’ structure and expectations which can influence upon the working of various 
channels of monetary policy transmission. The focus of the present paper is, 
however, restricted to an attempt at identifying the channels of monetary policy in 
India which play critical role in achieving the final objectives of price stability and 
output. In the Indian context, a few studies have been attempted to examine the 
monetary policy transmission. However, most of them focused on investigating a 
particular channel of monetary policy transmission and, therefore, were limited in 
scope. The present paper studies all the major channels of monetary policy 
transmission by using structural VAR approach. Against this backdrop, the paper is 
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divided into four sections. Section II provides an overview as to how various 
channels can operate and influence inflation and output. Section III offers a review of 
literature on evidence of monetary policy transmission in the cross country as well 
the Indian context. Section IV discusses the methodological framework adopted in 
the paper for examining the monetary policy transmission in the Indian context. 
Section V discusses the empirical findings and Section VI provides concluding 
observations. 
 
II. Monetary Policy Transmission: An Overview of Various Channels 
There is a general consensus that monetary policy affects macroeconomic 
variables, viz., GDP and prices over the business cycle. It can happen through a 
number of channels. However, there is no empirical consensus on the precise 
working and the relative importance of the various channels and, therefore, monetary 
policy transmission is still considered to be a “black box”. 
The traditional channel for monetary policy transmission is the interest rate 
channel which is described under the Keynesian IS-LM model. Under the interest 
rate channel, changes in monetary policy are eventually reflected in the real long-
term interest rates which influence aggregate demand by altering business 
investment and durable consumption decisions. This, in turn, gets reflected in 
aggregate output and prices. Under the assumption of sticky prices in the short-run, 
monetary policy expansion (tightening) leads to lower (higher) nominal interest rates 
which translate into lower (higher) real interest rates. However, the interest rate 
channel may remain active even under conditions of flexible prices. 
Unlike the interest rate channel, the credit channel assumes that banks play 
an important role in financial intermediation in an economy. Credit channel becomes 
important as a certain category of small borrowers may not have access to bond 
markets. Therefore, bank credit is also taken into account along with money and 
bonds while examining the monetary policy transmission. In the credit channel, 
monetary policy affects the economy through two channels, as bank credit channel 
and as balance sheet channel that complement each other. Expansionary monetary 
policy leads to higher deposits inducing banks to disburse higher credit, which in turn 
impacts investment and consumer spending. However, efficacy of this channel has 
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been doubted as banks have increasingly shifted from non-traditional banking 
business and, therefore, may not be much important in overall financial 
intermediation in an economy. Credit channel which operates through balance sheet 
channel occurs through various ways. For instance, monetary policy expansion 
(contraction) can raise (lower) equity prices of firms which increase (decrease) their 
net worth and there will be lesser (higher) concerns for adverse selection of 
borrowers by banks. Similarly, monetary policy can impact banks’ lending decisions 
by influencing household balance sheets. 
Another important channel that can impact macro variables is the asset price 
channel. Apart from bond prices, there are two other major categories of asset prices 
through which monetary policy can transmit to the economy. First is the transmission 
of monetary policy on stock market prices which can impact macro variables through 
wealth effect as well as Tobin’s q. Expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy 
can lead to higher (lower) valuation of equity which can induce (deter) household 
consumption as they perceive value of their wealth to be higher (lower). Monetary 
policy expansion can favourably impact equity prices which raises the market value 
of firms as compared to the replacement cost of capital (Tobin’s q). When Tobin’s q 
is high (low), firms will be encouraged (discouraged) to undertake investment by 
issuing equity which will accelerate (decelerate) economic activity in the economy. 
Second is the transmission of monetary policy through exchange rate which 
can play a more critical role for open economies with flexible exchange rate. With 
monetary policy expansion (contraction), as interest rates fall (increase), domestic 
currency deposits become less attractive relative to foreign currency. Therefore, it 
can lead to a fall in value of domestic currency which in turn can act as a boosting 
factor for exports and hence overall aggregate demand for the economy. Impact of 
depreciating currency can also lead to higher inflation if the pass-through of higher 
import prices to domestic prices is complete. Similarly, changes in exchange rate 
can affect firms’ balance sheet, particularly in emerging market economies (EMEs), 
as their debt may be denominated in foreign currency. Expansionary monetary 
policy, leading to depreciation of domestic currency, raises liabilities of firms as debt 
value in domestic currency increases. This can erode the net worth of firms and raise 
risk of adverse selection for banks. The overall impact will be lower lending from 
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banks to borrowers for investment which will adversely impact output. Such effect 
has been observed during recent global financial crisis in a number of EMEs. 
Another channel that has been identified in literature is the expectations 
channel. Agents form expectations about the future shocks to the economy and the 
response of central bank. Under this channel, the entire expected path of interest 
rates, not solely the current policy rate, triggers changes in asset prices, credit and 
spending which, in turn, lead to changes in output and prices. Economic agents 
shape their views on future macroeconomic outcomes based on the belief about the 
central bank’s ability and commitment in anchoring inflation expectations. Therefore, 
the efficacy of this channel also depends on the credibility of central banks. 
The above discussion suggests that the impact of monetary policy on the 
economy can come through various channels which, however, are not entirely 
mutually exclusive. For instance, asset price channel (equity prices as well as 
exchange rate) works along with credit channel and it may be difficult to separate out 
their relative strength. The relative importance of each channel, however, may vary 
across economies depending on their structural characteristics, the depth of financial 
markets, the availability of monetary policy instruments, the fiscal policy and the 
degree of openness. The overall response of the macro variables to monetary policy 
is, therefore, expected to incorporate the impact of each of these channels. 
 
III. Literature Review: Cross-country Evidence  
A large body of literature on the monetary transmission mechanism has 
debated on the working of the traditional “monetary” or “interest-rate” channel and 
“credit channel” of transmission. The traditional channels of monetary policy 
transmission are based on models of investment, consumption and international 
trade. The interest rate channel lies at the core of the traditional Keynesian IS-LM 
model, originally propounded by Hicks (1937). In fact, the importance of traditional 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission was well argued in Keynes’ 
general theory of output and employment. Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) life-cycle 
theory of consumption emphasised the role of asset based wealth as well as income 
in determining consumption behaviour. Identifying a channel of monetary 
transmission, life-cycle theory highlighted that if stock prices fall after a tightening of 
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monetary policy, household would find the value of their assets (wealth) falling, 
leading to a fall in consumption and output. The description of the monetarist 
transmission mechanism by Friedman and Schwartz [1963] also involved a rich array 
of assets besides money supply. Subsequently, Tobin’s [1969] q-theory of 
investment explained the traditional interest rate channel operating through the user 
cost of capital and portfolio choice.  
Since Bernanke’s seminal paper in 1986, providing alternative explanations of 
real and nominal sources of prices for explaining money-income relationship in 
addition to the standard explanations given earlier, the issue of monetary policy 
transmission has been extensively researched. Examining the impact of monetary 
policy on bank loans in the context of the US, Bernanke and Blinder [1988] 
suggested that open market sales by the Federal Reserve, draining reserves and 
hence deposits from the banking system, would limit the supply of bank loans by 
reducing banks' access to loanable funds. This effect, transmitted through the level 
and composition of bank assets, was over and above the traditional money supply 
and interest-rate effects implicit in IS-LM framework. However, Romer and Romer 
[1990] concluded that credit channel was ineffective.  
The debate on monetary policy transmission was extended further in a 
Symposium on ‘The Monetary Policy Transmission’ in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives [1995], where alternative views on channels of monetary policy 
transmission were provided by Taylor, Rogoff and Obstfeld, Meltzer, Bernanke and 
Gertler, and Mishkin. While there was consensus on the role of money in influencing 
aggregate demand and prices, disagreement continued over the transmission 
channel. 
Following the views of Friedman (1970) on monetary policy transmission and 
his critics - including Meltzer, Brunner, Tobin and Patinkin - Taylor [1995] attempted 
to review the impact on monetary policy transmission on real GDP and prices using 
a financial market prices framework. This framework highlighted the role of monetary 
policy in determining prices and rates of return on financial assets, interest rates, and 
exchange rates which in turn influence the spending decisions of firms and 
households. Under the financial market view, Taylor [1995] found the traditional 
interest rate channel to be important for monetary policy transmission to the real 
economy. Rogoff and Obstfeld [1995] emphasised the importance of exchange rate 
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channel of monetary policy transmission. Meltzer [1995] argued for monetarist 
emphasis on monetary policy transmission through multiple asset prices extending 
beyond interest rates, exchange rate and equity prices. Based on the experience of 
Japanese economy during the 1980s and 1990s, he argued that monetary policy can 
have significant impact on the economy through wealth effect due to changes in 
value of land and property.  
Bernanke and Gertler [1995] highlighted the inadequacy of interest rate 
channel due to weak cost of capital effects. Elaborating on the lack of understanding 
on the exact process of transmission of monetary policy, they argued: 
“[T]he same research that has established that changes in monetary policy 
are eventually followed by changes in output is largely silent about what 
happens in the interim. To a great extent, empirical analysis of the effects of 
monetary policy has treated the monetary transmission mechanism itself as a 
‘black box’.” 
Recognising the gaps in the conventional argument on interest rate channel, 
Bernanke and Gertler [1995] tried to elaborate their view on credit channel. Given 
the empirically well established theories that non-neoclassical factors, e.g., 
accelerator variables (including lagged output levels), largely determine spending 
decisions, it was argued that cost of capital effect tends to be weak. Another 
argument was that the impact of monetary policy actions is expected to be stronger 
on short-term interest rate rather than long-term interest rates. If this is the case, 
then the puzzle is how monetary policy can have large effects on purchases of 
durable assets which should be responsive primarily to changes in real long-term 
rates. It was argued that credit channel could potentially help resolve these puzzles. 
While credit channel is not entirely a distinct and parallel channel to the traditional 
interest rate channel, it certainly propagates the interest rate effects by endogenous 
changes in the external finance premium, i.e., cost differential of funds raised 
externally and generated internally. Monetary policy tightening increases external 
finance premium (through the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel), 
which, in turn, amplifies the effect of traditional interest rate channel.2 On the 
                                                 
2 Monetary policy tightening weakens borrowers’ balance sheet as (i) rising interest rate directly increases debt 
servicing costs, reducing net cash flows and (ii) declining asset prices reduce the value of collaterals. As a result, 
external finance premium for borrowers increases.  
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contrary, Edwards and Mishkin [1995] argued that with increasing financial 
innovations, banks were becoming increasingly less important in credit markets.  
Based on theoretical perspective provided on channels of monetary policy 
transmission, various studies have been conducted using either the narrative 
approaches or vector auto regression (VAR), including structural VAR (SVAR), factor 
augmented VAR. Ramey [1993] found that the money channel was much more 
important than credit channel in explaining the direct transmission of monetary policy 
shock on the US economy. Having found the inflation rising for a while after a 
monetary tightening, Christiano et al. [1999] viewed that the existence of a supply-
side channel for monetary policy could be an explanation for the ‘price puzzle’.  
In the context of euro area countries, Angeloni et al [2003] found that the 
interest rate channel completely characterised transmission in a few euro area 
countries, and was estimated to be substantial in almost all countries. Where the 
interest rate channel was not found to be dominant, there was some direct evidence 
supporting the presence of a bank lending channel (or other financial transmission 
channel). In another study on euro area, Angeloni and Ehrmann [2003] found 
financial markets channel to be somewhat weaker but suggestive. Examining the 
transmission of monetary policy in New Zealand by using a Structural VAR 
approach, Buckle et al [2003] suggested a weak transmission channel from domestic 
interest rates to domestic demand either indirectly through a reduction in equity 
returns or directly through a dampening effect on household consumption and firm 
investment. Recognising the limitations of low dimensional VAR models, Bernanke et 
al. [2005] suggested using FAVAR which can accommodate a rich data set relevant 
for explaining the ‘price puzzle’ often found while examining monetary policy 
transmission to prices under traditional VAR framework. Using a DSGE model with 
financial frictions, Christiano et al. [2008] found that the ECB's policy actions had a 
greater stabilising effect than those of the Fed as the former’s policy rule was 
characterized by greater persistence. 
A number of studies have examined the efficacy of various channels for EMEs 
as well. De Fiore [1998] found credit and exchange rate channels to be more 
important than the interest rate channel for the Israeli economy. Hung [2007] found 
broadly the similar effects for the Vietnamese economy. Following the VAR 
framework, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul [2003] found that in addition to the traditional 
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interest rate channel, bank credit play an important role in monetary policy 
transmission mechanism while exchange rate and asset price channels have been 
relatively less significant. Based on a macro econometric model for the Philippines 
economy, Bayangos [2010] provided evidence that bank credit channel mattered in 
monetary transmission mechanism. Using a broader set of 110 variables under 
FAVAR framework, Kabundi and Nonhlanhla [2011] for South Africa concluded that 
a monetary policy shock did not have a contemporaneous impact on the real 
economy and its effects did not last long. Similarly, a rise in the short-term interest 
rate decreases prices gradually, but the impact was found to be short lived. In 
addition to interest rate channel, the authors also found evidence of importance of 
confidence channel as business and consumer confidence are indicative of 
expectations of future economic outcomes.  
Based on VAR techniques, Tsangarides [2010] suggested weak monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in Mauritius as variations of the policy variables 
accounted for a small percentage of the fluctuations in output and prices. 
Amarasekara [2008] found interest rate to be an important channel for monetary 
policy transmission in Sri Lanka. Mohanty and Turner [2008] argued that credible 
monetary policy frameworks led the interest rate channel to be more effective across 
EMEs. On the contrary, Bhattacharya et al [2011] highlighted weakness in domestic 
financial system and the presence of a large and segmented informal sector 
responsible for ineffective monetary policy transmission. However, the study 
suggested exchange rate channel to be most effective channel for impacting inflation 
while interest rate was found to have no impact on aggregate demand, implying the 
absence of inflation-output trade-off. Mukherjee and Bhattacharya [2011] found the 
interest rate channel to be important for private consumption and investment in 
EMEs, with and without inflation targeting. Comparing the monetary policy 
transmission between dollarised and non-dollarised economies, Acosta-Ormaechea 
and Coble [2011] found that the traditional interest rate channel to be more important 
in Chile and New Zealand (non-dollarised) while the exchange rate channel played a 
more substantial role in controlling inflationary pressures in Peru and Uruguay 
(dollarized). While most studies found one or more channel to be working across 
EMEs, Mishra et al. [2010] found that weak institutional mechanism impaired the 
efficacy of interest rate, bank lending and asset price channels. 
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Based on the survey of empirical studies, Loyaza and Schmidt-Hebbel [2002] 
and Boivin et al [2010] concluded that interest rate channel continued to remain the 
core channel. Furthermore, recent theoretical works on the monetary transmission 
mechanism have also largely focused on better understanding of the traditional 
interest rate channel by using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models.  
Recent episode of financial crisis raised a number of issues with regard to 
monetary policy transmission mechanism as central banks had to undertake 
unconventional measures to keep the interest rate pass-through channel operational. 
Post-crisis research has broadly highlighted the incompleteness of extant models for 
studying the monetary transmission mechanism. Cecchetti et al. [2009] emphasised 
that separating out the effects of the various channels during the crisis period was 
difficult and also suggested to employ a modified framework to study monetary policy 
transmission. Walsh [2009] also discussed the role of financial frictions for 
understanding the monetary policy transmission process. Taylor and Williams [2010] 
viewed that simple interest rate rules worked well in transmitting the monetary policy 
albeit further research based on a wider set of information, especially international 
linkages of monetary policy, was needed. Bernanke [2010] was apprehensive about 
the efficacy of interest rate rule during pre-crisis period and concluded that central 
banks lacked the understanding of implications of financial innovation for monetary 
policy transmission. Carney [2010] assessed that the monetary policy transmission 
was a variable having a pro-cyclical process, which inter alia was determined by 
regulation changing over time, financial innovation and confidence. Allen and Rogoff 
[2010] observed that transmission mechanism for monetary policy has changed over 
time, particularly for countries with very deep and sophisticated mortgage markets. 
Taking cognisance of the quantitative easing measures during the recent 
crisis, Curdia and Woodford [2010a, 2010b] emphasised that models for monetary 
policy transmission need to capture the additional dimensions of central bank policy 
measures, especially the balance sheet measures. Bean et al. [2010] highlighted the 
importance of role of financial intermediaries both in normal and crisis period for 
monetary policy transmission. They also argued that the role of monetary policy in 
the run up to crisis was less through conventional monetary policy channels but 
more from ‘risk taking channel’. Yellen [2011] highlighted that even though the 
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transmission channels, transmitting conventional and unconventional measures of 
central banks, were quite similar, ‘portfolio balance channel’ and ‘expectations’ 
channel, however, played important role during crisis. Joyce et al. [2011] 
underscored the importance of asset prices during the crisis period, which were 
expected to have conventional effects on output and inflation.  
Monetary Policy Transmission in India: Literature Review  
A few attempts have been made to examine the channels of monetary policy 
transmission for India. Al-Mashat [2003], using a structural vector error correction 
model (VECM) for the period 1980:Q1 to 2002:Q4, found that interest rate and 
exchange rate channels strengthen the transmission impact of monetary policy while 
there was little evidence on the working of bank lending channel due to presence of 
directed lending under priority sector lending. RBI [2005] estimated a 5-variable VAR 
for the period 1994-95 to 2003-04 and suggested (i) a positive shock to the bank rate 
(i.e., monetary tightening) had the expected negative effect on output and prices, 
with the peak effect occurring around six months after the shock, (ii) a positive shock 
to broad money (i.e., monetary expansion) increased output as well as prices with 
peak effect occurring almost two years and one year, respectively, after the shock 
and (iii) a positive shock to the exchange rate (i.e., depreciation of the rupee) leads 
to an increase in prices, with the peak effect taking place almost six months after the 
initial shock while the impact on output was found to be positive as was a priori 
expected. Pandit et al. [2006] found the existence of bank lending channel with small 
banks being more responsive to a policy shock. 
More recently, Singh and Kalirajan [2008] highlighted the significance of 
interest rate as the major policy variable for conducting monetary policy in the post-
liberalised Indian economy. On the contrary, Bhaumik et al. [2010] found the bank 
lending channel to be working much more effectively in a tight money period than in 
an easy money period in India. Analysing three channels, viz., credit channel, asset 
price channel and exchange rate channel, Aleem [2010] found only credit channel to 
be important. Patra and Kapur [2010] argued that aggregate demand responds to 
interest rate changes with a lag of at least three quarters, and the presence of 
institutional impediments in the credit market such as administered interest rates can 
lead to persistence of the impact of monetary policy up to two years. Pandit and 
Vashisht [2011] provided evidence that policy rate channel of transmission 
 11
mechanism - a hybrid of the traditional interest rate channel and credit channel - 
operated in India and other EMEs. Khundrakpam [2011] found the credit channel of 
monetary transmission to be significant and robust in the post-LAF period. Analysing 
the interest rate channel, Mohanty [2012] provided evidence that policy rate 
increases have a negative effect on output growth with a lag of two quarters and a 
moderating impact on inflation with a lag of three quarters.  
 
IV. Methodology 
We use a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) framework with external 
variables as exogenous variables to control for external influences3. These 
exogenous variables are assumed to have both contemporaneous and lag impact on 
the endogenous variables without any feedback effect.4 Further, in view of the 
limited number of variables which can be considered in the SVAR without losing 
degrees of freedom, each of the channels of transmission is examined only one at a 
time. This involves estimating a baseline SVAR model, which is augmented by the 
variables representing a particular channel of transmission each time separately5.  
Baseline SVAR Model  
The baseline model could be written as,  
G(L)Yt = C(L)Xt + Ut        (1) 
Here G(L) and C(L) represent matrix polynomials in the lag operator L for 
vectors of exogenous variables (Yt) and endogenous variables (Xt). Ut is a vector of 
structural disturbances.  
The endogenous variables in the baseline model include GDP, price and 
policy rate in that order. Potential exogenous variables include world GDP, world 
                                                 
3 SVAR model has been preferred as it enables providing explicit behavioral interpretations of the parameters. 
On the other hand, including external variables as exogenous variables, while controlling the increasing 
influence of external factors due to increasing globalisation, also enable resolving the problem of ‘price puzzle’ 
often faced by traditional SVAR models due to inability to accommodate all the relevant variables. 
4 It may, however, be noted that an exogenous variable will have a statistically significant direct impact only on 
the relevant endogenous variable, while the impact of other exogenous variables will not be statistically 
different from zero. Therefore, the exogenous variables do not necessarily have statistically significant direct 
impact on all the endogenous variables. 
5 For similar methodology, see for example, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) and Aleem (2010). However, 
while we use a SVAR framework, these studies employ a traditional VAR approach, besides the differences in 
the details of specifications. 
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commodity prices, interest rate policy of major developed countries such as the US 
and gross portfolio inflows, among others. The importance of including these 
external factors as controlling variables is for the following reasons. First, Indian 
economy has been increasingly getting integrated with the global economy, both 
financially and in terms of real economic activity. These are reflected in the 
increasing proportion of exports and imports and financial flows to GDP (Chart 1). 
Thus, the importance of global business cycle in the domestic economic activity 
would have increased over the years, leading to increasing synchronization in 
domestic and international business cycles. Consequently, world economic activity 
affects the level of aggregate demand and prices in the economy, and thus 
influences the monetary policy actions. Second, the influence of global commodity 
prices on some sectors of domestic prices might have become important over the 
years, though pass-through still continues to remain significantly suppressed such as 
that of crude oil prices. However, we do not observe any significantly synchronized 
movement between world commodity price inflation and WPI inflation in India during 
major part of our study period (correlation coefficient=0.2 during 1997-98:Q1 to 
2007-08:Q4) (Chart 2).  
 
Third, interest rate policy of the major advanced economies can have a major 
bearing on the domestic interest rate policy via the impact on real economic activity 
and financial flows. Financial flows have significant potential impact on the exchange 
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rate movements, which in turn will affect both the exports and imports. Domestic 
prices will be affected by the resulting change in aggregate demand and also via the 
pass-through impact of change in import prices brought about by the exchange rate 
movements. If the exchange rate movements following financial flows are controlled 
through intervention, domestic liquidity will be affected unless they are fully sterilised, 
which is not without cost. This change in domestic liquidity will, in turn, have effects 
on output and prices in the economy. However, financial flows in the aftermath of 
global crisis have largely been influenced by the quantitative easing pursued by the 
developed countries and not by the interest rate policy per se, as it has remained at 
zero or near zero since the crisis broke out. Thus, the movements in the US policy 
interest rates (Fed fund rate) and Indian policy rate (weighted call rate) are far less 
synchronised (Chart 3). Instead of federal funds rate, gross portfolio flows, capturing 
all push and pull factors, including that of federal funds rate and quantitative easing, 
could be directly included among the exogenous variables.  
Chart 3: Movement in Federal Funds Rate and Weighted Call Rate 
 
As for structural restrictions, we use point zero restriction approach for 
identification of monetary policy shock (for example, Vonak, 2005). It is assumed that 
monetary policy shocks have no immediate impact on real variables. Thus, in the 
matrix containing the contemporaneous impact of structural disturbances on 
endogenous variables, the elements pertaining to the impact of monetary policy on 
real variables are restricted to zero.  
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Thus, the benchmark SVAR model is written as, 
=  
where denotes VAR residuals and denotes structural shocks. The first equation 
represents no contemporaneous effect of shocks in price and interest rates to GDP. 
The second equation implies only GDP has a contemporaneous impact on price. 
The third equation removes the contemporaneous impact of GDP and price shocks 
to policy interest rate, implying monetary policy reacts to GDP and prices only with 
some lags.  
Augmented SVAR Model  
To examine the various transmission channels, each of the corresponding 
variables representing a particular channel are added to the above benchmark 
model alternatively, as an exogenous variable, and then, as the fourth endogenous 
variable. When considered as an exogenous variable, the structure of the SVAR 
restrictions remains the same as in the benchmark model, and the transmission 
through this channel is blocked. On the other hand, by treating it as an endogenous 
variable and allowing the dynamic interactions with the other variables, the 
transmission through this channel is opened. It is assumed that this transmission 
related variable is contemporaneously affected by all the three variables included in 
the baseline model. Thus, the augmented SVAR model of four variables takes the 
following form, 
=  
The strength of each channel is obtained by comparing two sets of impulse 
responses of inflation and growth to shocks on policy rate. The first impulse 
response is from the augmented VAR with channel related variable as an 
endogenous variable. The second impulse response is with the channel related 
variable as one of the exogenous variables in the augmented VAR. The two VAR 
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models have identical orthogonalized innovations, but with the difference that when 
the variables in interest is treated as exogenous, it blocks off any responses within 
the VAR that passes through the variable (Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul, 2003 and 
Aleem, 2010). 
Thus, we have three sets of variables, viz., purely endogenous, purely 
exogenous and transmission related variables which are alternatively considered as 
endogenous and exogenous variables. Purely endogenous variables are real GDP, 
WPI and policy rate (CMRSA). Purely exogenous variables are OECD GDP and 
gross portfolio inflows6. The transmission channel related variables are non-food 
credit and total credit (for credit channel), BSE SENSEX (for asset price channel), 
and REER and NEER (for exchange rate channel). For robustness tests, three 
alternative measures of real GDP at factor cost were used, viz., total GDP, non-
agricultural GDP and non-agricultural non-government GDP7.  
 The time period considered is quarterly data from 1996-97Q1 to 2011-12Q1. 
All the variables have been seasonally adjusted and log transformed except for the 
interest rate variables. It was found that, barring interest rate variables, all other 
variables were non-stationary and integrated of order one. Therefore, the SVAR 
estimates were carried out in first difference, except interest rate variables. The 
optimum lags of various models, baseline model as well as all other augmented 
models, suggested by various criteria varied from one to four. We, however, selected 
two lags to ensure that the lag is neither too short that it is unable to capture 
underlying dynamics in the system nor too long to run into degrees of freedom 
problem. 
 
V. Empirical Findings 
A. Baseline SVAR model 
 Of the three alternative measures of GDP, the overall consistency of the 
model in terms of direction of all the impulse responses vis-à-vis our a priori 
                                                 
6 World commodity prices and federal funds rate were excluded from the vector of exogenous variables, as they 
show no synchronized movement with call rate and WPI inflation in Chart 2 and 3, respectively.  
7 Non-agricultural GDP is defined as total GDP excluding agriculture and allied activities, while non-
agricultural non-government GDP further excludes ‘community, social and personal services’, which primarily 
reflects good and services provided by the general government, from non-agricultural GDP. 
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expectations was found to be more evident when non-agricultural non-government 
GDP was considered (Annex Chart 1)8. However, the responses of GDP growth and 
inflation to shocks in monetary policy (call rate) are negative in all the three 
alternative measures of GDP and are statistically significant for a number of lags in 
and around the peak impact . Thus, we report the results based on non-agricultural 
non-government GDP in the main text, while other results are presented in the 
Annex.  
Chart 4 depicts the dynamic response of GDP growth, inflation and call rate to 
one standard deviation shock in the call rate under two baseline VAR estimates, 
which are with and without the external exogenous variables9. The following can be 
observed. First, call rate to its own shock takes a longer time to converge back with 
exogenous factors than without. This is despite the shock of one standard deviation 
in call rate being smaller with exogenous variable than without as shown by blue line 
which is above the red line in the first period. Second, there is an elongated V-
shaped response of output, i.e., an unanticipated hike in policy rate leads to decline 
in GDP growth that dissipates slowly. However, with exogenous external factors 
included, the peak negative impact on GDP growth is felt faster in the second quarter 
as against in the third quarter without exogenous factors. But, the dissipation of the 
impact is much slower with the inclusion of exogenous variables than without. Third, 
the negative impact on inflation follows after the decline in GDP growth and the peak 
impact is also felt with a lag of one quarter from the corresponding peak impact on 
GDP growth. However, the peak impact is higher without exogenous variables than 
with exogenous variables, but the impact dissipates faster in the former than the 
latter. In other words, inclusion of external variables prolongs the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on GDP growth and inflation. Fourth, inclusion of exogenous variables 
more or less removes the problem of ‘price puzzle’.  
 
 
                                                 
8 For instance, with government component of GDP included, the impulse response of call rate to GDP growth 
shock was found to be negative. This negative response, however, could follow if this government component of 
GDP, which forms about 13 per cent of total GDP, is not affected by monetary policy shocks. Similarly, price 
initially falls to a positive shock in GDP growth that includes this government component of GDP. 
9 Besides the two external exogenous variables, a dummy variable which is 1 for 1997:4 and zero otherwise was 
included to control for sharp unexplained hike in weighted call rate.  
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Chart 4: Impulse Response of Policy rate, GDP and WPI to shock in Policy Rate 
 
  
The variance decomposition reported in Table 1 shows that call rate explains 
for 12.0 per cent of the total variation in GDP growth in about three years, while 
inflation explains for about 17.0 per cent of the total variation in the call rate. It we 
consider period since 2000:1, after the adoption of liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) 
with interest rate as the principal instrument of signaling policy stance, call rate 
accounts for over 21.0 per cent of the fluctuation in GDP growth. A higher 
percentage of over 24.0 per cent in the fluctuation of call rate is also explained by 
change in inflation rate. It is thus indicated that the importance of interest rate in the 
fluctuation of economic activity in India has increased since the adoption of LAF and 
monetary policy has been sensitive to inflation10.  
                                                 
10 However, given the short time period, to conserve the degrees of freedom, we estimate the models from 
1996:1 onwards when quarterly GDP data became available. 
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Table 1: Variance Decomposition of Base Model:  
Non-agricultural non-government GDP Growth 
 1996:1 to 2011:1 2000:1 to 2011:1 
 Variance Decomposition of DLGDP:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 84.2 6.9 8.9 74.0 9.7 16.3
8 80.3 7.7 12.1  66.7 12.0 21.3
10 79.7 7.8 12.5  65.8 12.3 21.9
 Variance Decomposition of DLWPI:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 3.7 93.6 2.8  4.1 89.7 6.3
8 3.7 91.9 4.4  4.1 87.0 8.9
10 3.7 91.8 4.5  4.2 86.8 9.0
 Variance Decomposition of CMRSA:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 0.2 14.3 85.5  0.3 20.3 79.4
8 0.3 17.2 82.5  2.2 24.2 73.6
10 0.4 17.4 82.3  2.5 24.3 73.1
 
B. Channels of Transmission11
(i) Credit Channel  
Credit channel works as an additional channel of transmission beyond the 
direct interest rate channel. Rise in interest rate following monetary tightening, 
besides reduction in demand for credit by raising the borrowing costs, can also 
impact GDP growth and inflation through curtailment of supply of credit by financial 
institutions. The importance of this channel would depend upon i) the degree to 
which monetary policy directly affects willingness of financial institutions to lend and 
ii) on the importance of number of borrowers who are dependent on financial 
institutions.  
Even though the share of bank credit in total credit to commercial sector in 
India has increased over the years, non-bank sources continue to remain important. 
In fact, since the mid 2000s, there has been some reversal in the trend, reflecting 
manifold increase in capital mobilised through equity, bonds, convertible cumulative 
                                                 
11 As in the case of base model shown in Chart 1 in annex and also mentioned above, the standard error band 
shows that the impulse responses of GDP growth and inflation for most of the channels are found to be 
statistically significant for a number of lags. However, we do not report the error bands, as our focus is on the 
directions of the impacts and the differences of the impacts when a particular channel is alternatively opened 
and blocked. 
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preference shares and other instruments. Similarly, capital flows on account of 
greenfield FDI as well as external commercial borrowing have also shown significant 
rise in recent years. It is possible that even if bank credit gets restricted with the hike 
in policy rate, credit from non-bank sources could either negate or reinforce the 
impact on GDP growth and inflation. Thus, we consider two alternative measures of 
credit, viz., total non-food bank credit and total credit (both from banks and non-
banks). 
From the impulse responses shown in Charts 5 and 6, it is seen that both the 
measures of credit yield similar results12. A positive shock to interest rate leads to 
decline in credit growth from the second quarter, but persists for a long time. 
Irrespective of whether credit is made endogenous or exogenous, the impulse 
responses of GDP growth to shock in policy rate are quite similar up to the third 
quarter. However, the impact thereafter dissipates much faster when credit is 
exogenous as compared to when credit is endogenous. After 10 quarters, the 
accumulated response when credit channel is blocked is about 16.0 per cent lower 
than when it is allowed to operate, indicating significant operation of credit channel 
on GDP growth in India.13 With total credit, the efficacy of credit channel is indicated 
to be more pronounced with accumulated response lower by about 25.0 per cent 
when the credit channel is blocked.14 The impact on inflation occurs with a lag after 
the impact on GDP growth. However, as compared to the impact on GDP growth, 
the impact is less pronounced on inflation. When the credit channels are blocked, the 
accumulated response of inflation is lower by 14 per cent for non-food credit, while it 
is lower by 23 per cent for total credit15.   
 
                                                 
12  Unexplained sharp increased in both non-food and total credit in 2002:1 was controlled by including an 
exogenous dummy variable which was 1 on this date and zero otherwise.  
13 The corresponding gaps estimated using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP are higher at           20.0 per cent 
and 29.0 per cent, respectively. 
14 The corresponding gaps estimated using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP are also higher at 25.0 per cent 
and 32.0 per cent, respectively. 
15 The corresponding gaps estimated using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP are 15.0 per cent and 5.0 per 
cent for non-food credit, and 25.0 per cent and 9.0 per cent for total credit, respectively. 
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Chart 5: Impulse Responses of Non-food Credit, GDP and WPI to Policy Rate 
 
 
 
Chart 6: Impulse Responses of Total Credit, GDP and WPI to Policy Rate 
 
 
(ii) Asset Price Channel 
Monetary policy can affect GDP growth and inflation through fluctuations in 
asset prices. A tightening of monetary policy will make equity prices less attractive as 
compared with other alternative assets, such as bond, leading to fall in equity prices. 
When equity prices fall, firms may find it costly to replace capital – Tobin’s q effect- 
and reduce investment. The decline in the asset prices will also have a net wealth 
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effect of reducing consumption demand for households and further dampen the 
earnings outlook of firms.  
 To analyse the asset price channel in India, we considered BSE SENSEX, 
which is one of the most popular index of Indian equity prices reported in the 
domestic and international markets. The impulse responses shown in Chart 7 reveal 
that a positive shock in policy rate expectedly leads to decline in equity prices, which 
peaks at the third quarter and dissipates slowly. Decline in GDP growth peaks in the 
second quarter by about 0.12 per cent below the baseline, but thereafter dissipates 
much faster when this channel is blocked by treating BSE SENSEX as exogenous. 
After 10 quarters, the accumulated response of GDP growth is lower by 30 per cent 
when the impact of the movement in equity prices is blocked than when it is allowed 
to operate16. 
 There is also a significant negative impact on inflation, which peaks in the 
fourth quarter. The dissipation of the impact is again much faster when this channel 
is blocked17. Consequently, when the channel is blocked, the accumulated response 
after 10 quarters is lower by about 37.0 per cent18. In other words, it is indicated that 
asset price channel is an important channel of monetary policy transmission in India. 
Chart 7: Impulse Responses of Sensex, GDP and WPI to Policy Rate 
 
                                                 
16 The corresponding gaps estimated using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP are 42.0 per cent and 39.0 per 
cent, respectively. 
17 However, we find the presence of price puzzle.  
18 The corresponding gaps estimated using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP are 66.0 per cent and 28.0 per 
cent, respectively. 
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(iii) Exchange Rate Channel 
The strength of exchange rate channel in monetary policy transmission will 
depend on several factors such as the exchange rate policy which determines the 
responsiveness of exchange rate to monetary policy, degree of openness of the 
economy, elasticity of net imports to exchange rate fluctuations, degree of exchange 
rate pass-through to domestic prices, etc. Depending upon these factors, a shock to 
monetary policy can have differential impact on the time path of adjustments in real 
and nominal exchange rate. Thus, we consider both REER and NEER to check for 
the presence of exchange rate channel of monetary transmission19. 
From Chart 8, it may be seen that a positive shock to policy rate leads to 
immediate appreciation of REER, followed by an overall depreciation that dissipates 
in about 10 quarters. This overall depreciation may appear to be a contradiction to 
theory on exchange rate determination based on interest rate differentials. But in the 
Indian context, it is highly plausible that interest rate differentials do not play an 
important role in exchange rate determination. The debt component of capital 
inflows, which are sensitive to interest rate differentials, is understood to be small in 
India, as there is deliberate policy to restrict/discourage this component of capital 
inflows. Major portion of the capital inflows are accounted by equity inflows in the 
form of both portfolio and FDI. These inflows would be largely determined by the 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as the GDP growth, level of inflation, current 
account deficit, fiscal deficit, etc. Thus, a hike in call rate often associated with 
negative fundamentals and sentiments about the domestic economy in terms of 
inflationary pressure and the dampening effect on growth, could lead to slowdown in 
equity component of capital inflows or even their outflows, which overshadow any 
additional debt inflows caused by the interest rate hike. Therefore, on a net basis, it 
is likely that hike in policy rate leads to slowdown or decline in net capital inflows 
leading to currency depreciation, but with a lag.  
Whether exchange rate is endogenous or exogenous makes very little 
difference to the impulse response of GDP growth. The difference in accumulated 
response after 10 quarters is only about 5 per cent higher than when the channel is 
                                                 
19 There was a sharp depreciation of over 15.0 per cent on quarter on quarter basis in both NEER and REER in 
2007-08:4. This was controlled by including an exogenous dummy variable which is 1 on this date and zero 
otherwise. 
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blocked20. With regard to the impact on inflation, the difference, however, is 
significant. After the third quarter, the impact on inflation dissipates much faster 
when exchange rate channel is allowed to operate. After 10 quarters, the 
accumulated response of inflation is about 18.0 per cent lower when the channel 
operates than without21. Thus, it appears that though exchange rate channel of 
monetary policy transmission to GDP growth is either absent or weak, it has non-
negligible impact on inflation by way of dampening the monetary policy impact. This 
follows as positive shock to policy rate leads to an overall depreciation of REER from 
the second quarter. While depreciation of REER may only marginally improve net 
exports, the increase in import prices and pass-through to domestic prices may 
dampen the negative impact of hike in policy rate on inflation. 
As shown in Chart 9, very similar results follow using NEER, except that 
NEER does not appreciate immediately as was seen in the case of REER. There is 
very little difference in the impact on GDP growth, but has a non-negligible monetary 
policy dampening impact on inflation.  
Chart 8: Impulse Responses of REER, GDP and WPI to Policy Rate 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The differences are even much less for the estimates using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP at about 2.0 
per cent and 3.0 per cent, respectively. 
21 The differences are lesser for the estimates using total GDP and non-agricultural GDP at about 14.0 per cent 
and 4.0 per cent, respectively. 
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Chart 9: Impulse Responses of NEER, GDP and WPI to Policy Rate 
 
 
 
(iv) Direct Interest Rate Channel  
 A rough way of observing the direct interest rate channel is in terms of the 
residual impact not explained by the three channels shown above. This can be done 
at least in two ways (for example, see Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul, 2003). First is by 
summing the unexplained portion of accumulated response by the three channels in 
the analysis above. Second is to augment the baseline SVAR by including all the 
three channels as endogenous variables at one time and compare the accumulated 
response with the corresponding response obtained by making all the three channels 
exogenous. It may, however, be noted that besides these four traditional channels, 
viz., interest rate, asset price, exchange rate and credit channel, there could be other 
channels of transmission. In fact, it is being argued that confidence channel since the 
global crisis has become an important channel of monetary transmission. Thus, the 
impact of direct interest rate channel in both the cases could contain the impact of 
other unexplained channels such as confidence channel22. 
 It was seen from above that, depending upon the alternative measures of 
credit and exchange rate, after 10 quarters, the accumulated responses of GDP 
growth from the three channels together accounted for about 45 to 55 per cent of the 
                                                 
22 A similar exercise was carried out to analyse the importance of confidence channel in monetary transmission 
using business confidence index published by National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). 
Using this index, however, we did not find any noticeable evidence on the operation of this channel.  
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total responses. In other words, about 50 per cent of the monetary transmission 
would be explained directly by the interest rate channel23. With regard to inflation, 
interest rate channel accounts for about one-third of the total accumulated responses 
after 10 quarters. The direct estimate obtained from the augmented SVAR shown in 
Chart 10 also confirms the importance of direct interest rate channel, which shows 
that after 10 quarters about two-thirds of the accumulated response of GDP growth 
and over 40 per cent of accumulated response of inflation could be attributed to 
interest rate channel.  
Chart 10: Impulse Response of GDP and WPI to Policy Rate 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Using SVAR models on quarterly data for 1996-97:1 to 2011-12:1, the paper 
examined the relative importance of various transmission channels of monetary 
policy to GDP growth and inflation in India. To check for robustness of the results, 
three alternative measures of GDP, viz., non-agriculture non-government GDP, non-
agriculture GDP and total GDP have been used. 
The paper finds that external exogenous factors prolong the impact of 
monetary policy transmission on GDP growth and inflation in India, while removing 
the problem of ‘price puzzle’. Among the various channels of transmission, interest 
rate channel, credit channel and asset prices channel are found to be important, 
                                                 
23 Other alternative models based on total GDP and non-agricultural GDP also show similar results indicating 
the importance of traditional direct interest rate channel. 
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while exchange rate channel is found to be weak. A positive policy shock leads to 
contraction in credit with a lag of two quarters and subsequently impacts GDP 
growth and inflation negatively. The same monetary policy shock leads to decline in 
asset prices from the third quarter onwards and has pronounced negative impact on 
GDP growth and inflation. Exchange rate channel is found to have an insignificant 
impact on GDP growth, but has non-negligible impact on inflation. Interest rate 
channel is found to account for about half of total impact of monetary shocks on GDP 
growth and about one-third of total impact on inflation, indicating that interest rate 
channel is the most important channel for monetary policy transmission in India.  
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Annex Chart 1 
A. Baseline SVAR model 
Annex Chart 1: Impulse Responses - non-agricultural non-government GDP
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Annex Chart 2: Impulse Responses - Total GDP 
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Annex Chart 3: Impulse Responses- non-agricultural GDP 
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Annex Chart 4: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation 
 to Policy Rate 
 
 
Annex Chart 5: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and WPI Inflation 
to Policy Rate 
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Annex Table 1: Variance Decomposition of Baseline Model: Total GDP Growth
 1996:1 to 2011:1 2000:1 to 2011:1 
 Variance Decomposition of DLGDP:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 87.8 10.1 2.2 77.4 14.5 8.1
8 85.7 10.4 3.9 73.5 15.4 11.2
10 85.5 10.5 4.0 73.2 15.4 11.4
             
 Variance Decomposition of DLWPI:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 11.5 86.6 1.9 12.2 81.9 5.9
8 11.4 84.9 3.7 11.6 76.6 11.8
10 11.4 84.7 3.8 11.6 76.5 11.9
             
 Variance Decomposition of CMRSA:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 4.2 9.2 86.6 2.2 15.3 82.6
8 4.4 9.9 85.6 3.2 16.4 80.4
10 4.5 10.0 85.5 3.2 16.3 80.4
 
Annex Table 2: Variance Decomposition of Baseline Model:  
Non-agricultural GDP Growth 
 
 1996:1 to 2011:1  2000:1 to 2011:1 
 Variance Decomposition of GDP:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA  DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 90.7 3.2 6.1  86.0 2.7 11.2
8 88.0 4.0 8.0  77.3 5.2 17.4
10 87.8 4.1 8.1  76.7 5.4 17.9
 Variance Decomposition of DLWPI:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA  DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 3.3 94.1 2.5  7.7 86.3 5.9
8 3.3 92.1 4.6  7.3 81.2 11.5
10 3.3 91.9 4.8  7.3 80.8 11.9
 Variance Decomposition of CMRSA:  
 Period DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA  DLGDP DLWPI CMRSA
4 3.5 14.5 82.0  3.0 16.6 80.4
8 3.6 16.9 79.5  3.1 19.3 77.7
10 3.6 17.0 79.4  3.1 19.4 77.5
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I. Credit Channel  
a) Non-food Credit 
Annex Chart 6: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation 
 to Policy Rate 
 
 
Annex Chart 7: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and WPI 
Inflation to Policy Rate 
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b) Total Credit 
Annex Chart 8: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation  
to Policy Rate 
 
 
Annex Chart 9: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and WPI 
Inflation to Policy Rate 
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II. Asset Price Channel 
Annex Chart 10: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation  
to Policy Rate 
 
 
Annex Chart 11: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and WPI 
Inflation to Policy Rate 
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III. Exchange Rate Channel 
a) REER 
Annex Chart 12: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation 
 to Policy Rate 
 
 
Annex Chart 13: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and WPI 
Inflation to Policy Rate 
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b) NEER 
Annex Chart 14: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation 
 to Policy Rate 
 
 
Annex Chart 15: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and 
 WPI Inflation to Policy Rate 
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IV. Direct Interest Rate Channel  
Annex Chart 16: Impulse Response of Total GDP Growth and WPI Inflation  
to Policy Rate 
 
Annex Chart 17: Impulse Response of Non-agricultural GDP Growth and  
WPI Inflation to Policy Rate 
 
 38
References: 
Acosta-Ormaechea, Santiago and David Coble [2011]. “Monetary transmission in 
dollarized and non-dollarized economies: The cases of Chile, New Zealand, Peru 
and Uruguay”, IMF Working Paper No.11/87, International Monetary Fund. 
Aleem, Abdul [2010]. “Transmission mechanism of monetary policy in India”, Journal 
of Asian Economics, 21, 186-197. 
Allen, Franklin and Kenneth Rogoff [2010]. “Asset prices, financial stability and 
monetary policy”, http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-39.pdf. 
Al-Mashat, R. [2003]. Monetary policy transmission in India: Selected issues and 
statistical appendix, Country report no. 03/261, International Monetary Fund. 
Amarasekar, C. [2008]. “The impact of monetary policy on economic growth and 
inflation in Sri Lanka”. CBSL Staff Studies, 38, No 1&2. 
Ando, Albert, and Franco Modigliani [1963]. “The ‘life-cycle’ hypothesis of saving: 
aggregate implications and tests,” American Economic Review, 53, 55–84. 
Angeloni, Ignazio, Anil K Kashyap, Benoît Mojon and Daniele Terlizzese [2003]. 
“Monetary transmission in the euro area: does the interest rate channel explain all?”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 9984, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bayangos, Veronica B. [2010]. “Does the bank credit channel of monetary policy 
matter in the Philippines?”, available at  
www.bis.org/repofficepubl/arpresearch201003.12.pdf
Bean, Charles, Jens Larsen and Kalin Nikolov [2002]. “Financial frictions and the 
monetary transmission mechanism: theory, evidence and policy implications”, ECB 
Working Paper No.113, European Central Bank. 
Bean, Charles; Matthias Paustian, Adrian Penalver and Tim Taylor [2010]. “Monetary 
policy after fall”, paper presented at Jackson Hole Symposium Wyoming, September 
16. 
Bernanke, Ben S. [1986]. “Alternative explanations of the money-income correlation,” 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, Vol. 25, 49-99. 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Alan S. Blinder [1988]. “Credit, money, and aggregate 
demand”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 78, 435-439. 
Bernanke, Ben and Alan Blinder [1992]. “The federal funds rate and the channels of 
monetary transmission”, American Economic Review, 82, 901-21. 
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler [1995]. “Inside the black box: the credit channel of 
monetary transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27-48. 
 39
Bernanke, B. [2010]. “Monetary policy and the housing bubble,” Speech to the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. 
Bernanke, Ben S. [2011]. “The economic outlook and macroeconomic policy”, 
Speech at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., February 3.  
Bhaumik, S. K., Vinh Dang and Ali M. Kutan. [2010]. “Implications of bank ownership 
for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission: evidence from India”, William 
Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 988, University of Michigan. 
Bhattacharya, Rudrani, Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah [2011]. “Monetary policy 
transmission in an emerging market setting”, IMF Working Paper No.11/5. 
Boivin, Jean, Michael T. Kiley and Frederic S. Mishkin [2010]. “How has the 
monetary transmission mechanism evolved over time?”, NBER Working Paper No. 
15879, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Cecchetti, Stephen G., Marion Kohler and Christian Upper [2009]. “Financial crises 
and economic activity”, Paper presented at Jackson Hole Symposium Wyoming, 
August 10-11. 
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, M., and C. Evans [1999], “Monetary policy shocks: 
What have we Learned and to what end?” in J. B. Taylor, and M.Woodford, ed., 
Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier Science, North Holland. 
Christiano Lawrence, Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno [2008]. “Shocks, 
structures or monetary policies? The Euro Area and US after 2001”, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 32, 2476-2506. 
Curdia, Vasco and Michael Woodford [2010a]. “The central-bank balance sheet as 
an instrument of monetary policy”, NBER Working Paper No. 16208, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Curdia, Vasco and Michael Woodford [2010b]. “Conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, July-
August. 
De Fiore, Fiorella [1998]. “The transmission of monetary policy in Israel”, IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/98/114, International Monetary Fund. 
Disyatat, Piti and Pinnarat Vongsinsirikul [2003]. “Monetary policy and the 
transmission mechanism in Thailand”, Journal of Asian Economics, 14. 
Edwards, Franklin and Frederic S. Mishkin [1995]. “The decline of traditional 
banking: implications for financial stability and regulatory policy”, NBER Working 
Papers No. 4993, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 40
European Central Bank [2010]. “Monetary policy transmission in the Euro Area, a 
decade after the introduction of the Euro”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, May. 
Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz [1963]. “A monetary history of the 
United States, 1867-1960”, Princeton University Press. 
Hung, Le Viet [2007]. “A Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Vietnam”, available at 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/vietnam/VDFTokyo/Doc/35LVHung18Aug07Paper.pdf
Joyce, Michael, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods [2011]. “The United Kingdom’s 
quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact”, Quarterly Bulletin 2011 Q3, 
Bank of England. 
Kabundi A., and Nonhlanhla, N. [2011]. “Assessing monetary policy in South Africa 
in a data-rich environment”, South African Journal of Economics, 79, 91-107. 
Khundrakpam, Jeevan Kumar [2011]. “Credit channel of monetary transmission in 
India - how effective and long is the lag?”, RBI Working Paper No. WPS (DEPR): 20/ 
2011.  
Loayza, Norman and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel [2002]. “Monetary policy functions and 
transmission mechanisms: an overview”, available at 
http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/banca-central/pdf/v4/001_020Gallego.pdf. 
Meltzer, Allan H. [1995]. “Monetary, credit and (other) transmission processes: a 
monetarist perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 49-72. 
Mishkin, Frederic S. [1995]. “Symposium on the monetary transmission mechanism”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 3-10. 
Mishkin, Frederic S. [1996]. “Channels of monetary transmission and lessons for 
monetary policy”, NBER Working Paper No.5464, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Mishkin, Frederic S. [2001]. “The transmission mechanism and the role of asset 
prices in monetary policy”, NBER Working paper No.8617, National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Mishra, Prachi, Peter J. Montiel and Antonio Spilimbergo [2010]. “Monetary 
transmission in low income countries”, CEPR Discussion Paper No.DP7951. 
Mohanty, D. [2012]. “Evidence on interest rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission in India”, paper presented at the Second International Research 
Conference at the Reserve Bank of India, February 1-2.  
 41
Mohanty, M. S. and Philip Turner [2008]. “Monetary policy transmission in emerging 
market economies: what is new?”, BIS Papers No.35, Bank of International 
Settlements. 
Mukherjee, Sanchita and Rina Bhattacharya [2011]. “Inflation targeting and monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms in emerging market economies”, IMF Working 
Paper No. WP/11/229, International Monetary Fund. 
Ncube, Mthuli and Eliphas Ndou [2011]. “Monetary policy transmission, house prices 
and consumer spending in South Africa: an SVAR approach”, Working Paper No. 
133, African Development Bank Group. 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff [1995]. “The mirage of fixed exchange rates”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 73-96. 
Pandit, B.L, Ajit Mittal, Mohua Roy and Saibal Ghosh [2006]. “Transmission of 
monetary policy and the bank lending channel: analysis and evidence for India”, 
DRG Study No.25, Reserve Bank of India. 
Pandit, B. L. and Pankaj Vashisht [2011]. “Monetary policy and credit demand in 
India and some EMEs”, ICRIER Working Paper No.256. 
Patra, Debabrata Michael and Muneesh Kapur [2010]. “A monetary policy model 
without money for India”, IMF Working Paper No.10/183, International Monetary 
Fund. 
Ramey, Valerie A. [1993]. “How important is the credit channel in the transmission of 
monetary policy?”, NBER Working Paper No. 4285, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. [1990]. “New evidence on the monetary transmission 
mechanism”, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 1, 149-213. 
Reserve Bank of India [1985]. Report of the committee to review the working of the 
monetary system (Chairman: S. Chakravarty), Bombay. 
Reserve Bank of India [1998]. Report of the working group on money supply: 
analytics and methodology of compilation (Chairman: Dr. Y.V. Reddy), June. 
Reserve Bank of India [2005]. Report on currency and finance, 2003-04. 
Reserve Bank of India [2011]. Report of the working group on operating procedure of 
monetary policy (Chairman: Deepak Mohanty). 
Singh, Kanhaiya and Kaliappa Kalirajan [2007]. “Monetary transmission in post-
reform India: an evaluation”, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 12, 158–187. 
 42
Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters [2002]. “An estimated dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model of the Euro Area”, ECB Working Paper No.171, European Central 
Bank. 
Taylor, John B. [1995]. “The monetary transmission mechanism: an empirical 
framework”, Journal of Economic Perspective, 9, 11-26. 
Taylor, John B. and John C. Williams [2010]. “Simple and robust rules for monetary 
policy”, NBER Working Paper No.15908, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Tobin, J. [1969]. "A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory", Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking, 1, 15–29. 
Trichet, Jean-Claude [2011]. Introductory statement to the press conference, 
European Central Bank, Frankfurt, February 3. 
Walsh, Carl E. [2009]. “Using monetary policy to stabilize economic activity”, Paper 
presented at Jackson Hole Symposium Wyoming, August 10-11. 
Yellen, Janet L. [2011]. “Unconventional monetary policy and central bank 
communication” Speech at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business U.S. 
Monetary Policy Forum, New York, New York, February 25.  
 
 
 
 43
